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Abstract 
We propose a new empirical approach to analyzing fiscal decentralization and apply it to Chinese 
intergovernmental fiscal relationships between the central government and provincial governments.  
In calculating budgetary revenue and expenditure shares, we include extra budgetary revenue and 
expenditure.  We find that although an increase in either income inequality or real per capita GDP 
lowers local governments’ bargaining power within the budgetary system, local governments can 
offset this by obtaining more bargaining power over extra budgetary expenditures.  Another finding is 
that although urbanization increases provincial governments’ budgetary revenues, it also restricts the 
scope for further budgetary expenditure. 
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1.  Introduction 
Having been established after World War Two, (the People’s Republic of) China has a 
history of only 60 years, as have its intergovernmental relationships, which have been changing 
rapidly, as Man (2011) has pointed out.  China has five layers of government, and 
intergovernmental transfers flow from higher to lower levels of government.  If we limit our 
attention to central–provincial intergovernmental relations, there are several types of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems, such as the fiscal contract systems that existed between 
1979 and 1993, and the fiscal sharing system that has existed since 1994.  Revenue and 
expenditure shares have changed dramatically following the decentralization of the 1980s and by 
revenue recentralization and expenditure decentralization from 1994.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
trends in local government’s shares of revenue and expenditure, both with and without extra 
budgetary revenues and expenditures.  These historical changes complicate the assignment of 
central and local government responsibilities.  (See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao 
(2011) for a discussion.) 
Several researchers have investigated these historical changes and their determinants.  
Of course, no researcher can explain these changes consistently or establish a rule in relation to 
them.  Huang and Chen (2012) pointed out that there is no systematic rule for distributing fiscal 
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transfers from the central to provincial governments.  As Zhang and Zou (1998) pointed out, 
variations among provinces are too large to form a simple rule or to introduce some incentive 
mechanism; for example, based on theoretical insights from fiscal federalism. 
In this paper, we develop a new approach to analyzing nonsymmetric Nash bargaining.  
Our approach involves restricting bargaining between the central government and provincial 
governments over shares of fiscal revenues and expenditures.  This simple approach differs from 
those adopted by researchers on fiscal federalism, or decentralization, but enables us to shed new 
light on intergovernmental fiscal relationships. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we survey the literature on fiscal 
federalism, or decentralization, and intergovernmental relationships in China.  In Section 3, we 
develop a two-person bargaining game and use its first-order condition to develop a simple 
econometric model.  In Section 4, we conduct an empirical investigation.  In Section 5, we 
conclude the paper and discuss remaining issues. 
2.  Literature Survey of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships 
Much theoretical and empirical investigation of fiscal federalism, or decentralization, 
followed the seminal paper on fiscal federalism by Oates (1968).  Weingast (2009) categorized 
these studies into first- and second-generation studies based on their theoretical assumptions.  
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However, from the empirical researcher’s point of view, there are two types of studies of fiscal 
federalism, or decentralization.  In one type, the consequences of fiscal federalism, or 
decentralization, are investigated.  In the other type, degrees and causes of fiscal decentralization 
are investigated. 
Examples of the former include the study of Woller and Phillips (1998), who 
investigated the effect of decentralization on less developed countries’ economic growth, and 
Davoodi and Zou (1998), who investigated the same effect by using panel data on 46 countries.  
In the Chinese context, Jin et al. (2005), Chen (2013), and Zhang and Zou (1998), who all use 
panel data, and Zhang (2006), who uses so-called growth regression, investigated the relationship 
between the fiscal decentralization and economic growth.  Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) 
investigated the effects of economic and fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic indicators 
such as economic growth and inflation.  In the context of China’s recent rapid economic growth, 
Qian and Roland (1998) concluded that China’s recent good economic performance was led by 
the combination of political centralization and the fiscal decentralization of the Chinese Central 
Government.  Zhang (2006) and Zheng et al. (2013) also stress the role of political considerations 
in China’s recent high economic growth.  Tochkov (2007) and Tsui (2005) investigated the 
effects on the dispersion of local governments’ expenditures of fiscal transfers by the central 
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government to local governments.  Wei (1996), Kanbur and Zhang (2005), and Huang and Chen 
(2012) investigated the effects of central government transfers on regional income inequality. 
Oates (1972, Chapter 5), who investigated the revenue share of the central government, 
was one of the first to investigate the degrees and causes of fiscal decentralization.  For the 
purpose of making international comparisons, Panizza (1999) used cross-sectional data on 57 
countries to investigate the determinants of fiscal centralization.  Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
used panel data on 48 countries to conduct a similar analysis.  In relation to the Chinese case, only 
Zhang and Zheng (2011) and Lin (2011) have investigated the rules governing central 
government fiscal transfers to local governments.  There has so far been no empirical 
investigation of the factors enabling such fiscal decentralization, or recentralization, or of the 
economic determinants of such historical movements. 
3.  The Nonsymmetric Nash Solution and Empirical Modeling 
Although Tsui and Wang (2008) developed a game theoretic model of Chinese 
decentralization, theirs is a theoretical study that lacks empirical investigation.  We know of no 
empirical study in which central and local government fiscal shares are determined based on a 
game theoretic analysis in which several local governments participate in the bargaining, and 
each government, including the central government, tries to maximize its objective function.  
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Such a bargaining model is not easy to implement empirically because of the difficulty of forming 
a simple estimable equation.  In this paper, to simplify bargaining between the central government 
and several local governments, we develop a two-person bargaining game, in which the central 
government is one player, and the group of provincial governments is the other player.  Then, we 
use the nonsymmetric Nash solution for the budgetary shares of the central government and the 
groups of local governments.  Denoting the local governments’ budget share by   implies that the 
central government’s share is (   ).  Based on these shares, we set up a nonsymmetric Nash 
solution as the maximization of the following objective function: 
   (   )   . (1) 
This type of function was originally introduced by Kalai (1977).  (For details, please refer to 
Myerson, 1991, pp. 390–394.)  However, in this paper, we set both the central and local 
governments’ threshold points to zero.  In this model,   represents the relative bargaining power 
of the local government group.  Hence, the central government’s relative bargaining power is 
   .  The first-order condition for maximizing the objective function is 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  (2) 
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It is assumed that   is between zero and unity.  Given the history of power politics between 
central and local government,   should vary over time.  Hence, we write p as   .  To simplify the 
specification of the estimating equation, we further assume that    can be approximated by using 
the following cumulative logistic distribution function: 
    
   
     
  (3) 
In addition, we assume that    is a linear function of our independent variables, as follows: 
      
    (4) 
where    and   are column vectors of the independent variables and their coefficients, 
respectively.  By using equations (3) and (4), equation (2) can be rewritten as 
 
  
    
    
     
Logarithmic transformation and the addition of an error term yield 
   (
  
    
)    
       (5) 
This is the well-known logistic transformation from econometrics.  The dependent variable is 
similar to the logarithmically transformed decentralization index used by Zhang and Zou (1998).  
To be specific, they used the ratio of the local governments’ expenditures to central government 
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expenditures as an index of decentralization in their regression model of China’s economic 
growth.  Although the index in (5) is not mentioned in the comprehensive discussions of 
decentralization indices by Zhang and Zou (1998) and Vo (2008), it is intuitively appealing as an 
index of decentralization.  Therefore, estimating equation (5), and its expenditure version 
described in the next section, constitutes empirical research on the determinants of fiscal 
decentralization.  This is confirmed by the fact that    is the parameter that determines the fiscal 
share of local governments in our bargaining model. 
4.  Estimation of Intergovernmental Relationships 
4.1 Econometric Model 
The two shares that represent intergovernmental budgetary relationships are the revenue 
share and the expenditure share.  We restate the revenue share of the local governments group as 
  and define the expenditure share of the local governments group as  .  To simplify the 
equations, we rewrite equation (5) in terms of the dependent variables   and   as follows: 
        (
  
    
)             (
  
    
)  
These two equations form the following system of equations for the budgetary shares: 
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  (6) 
which can be estimated by using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator or 
another simultaneous-equations estimator.  If any of the independent variables are correlated with 
the error terms, we should apply the instrumental variables (IV) method.  To deal with 
heteroscedasticity and moving average (MA)-type serial correlation in the error terms, we apply 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to this system of equations. 
4.2 Data 
We initially calculated the shares of central and local government’s fiscal expenditure 
and revenue for the period 1982–2008 from the Finance Yearbook of China 2012.  Defining these 
fiscal shares requires careful handling of extra budgetary revenues and expenditures.  Tsui (2005) 
and Tochkov (2007) pointed out the reverse effects of central government budgetary transfers and 
extra budgetary funds on local governments’ expenditures.  In the next section, we estimate 
models based on including and excluding extra budgetary items from the shares. 
We use eight independent variables: population; real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP); real economic growth; inflation; the central government’s fiscal deficit; trade openness; 
the degree of urbanization; and regional income inequality.  Below, we explain the rationale for 
using these independent variables. 
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Population: This is the national population.  Based on cross-sectional analysis of international 
data, Panizza (1999) found that population size positively affects fiscal decentralization. 
Real per capita GDP: Based on cross-sectional analysis of international data, Panizza (1999) 
found that national income positively affects fiscal decentralization.  To allow this variable to 
have a nonlinear effect on the dependent variable, we used not only real per capita GDP but also 
its square.  Real per capita GDP is calculated by dividing nominal per capita GDP (in 100 million 
yuan) by the consumer price index (CPI) (1950 = 100). 
Economic growth: Because economic growth may affect the central governments’ fiscal 
transfers, we include the annual growth rate of real GDP. 
Inflation: Cukierman et al. (1992), for example, pointed out that seigniorage and taxation are 
substitutable.  Hence, inflation affects the bargaining power of the central government through the 
central government’s seigniorage. 
Central government’s fiscal deficit: Among others, Ahmad (1997, p. 643) and Bahl (1999, p. 
75) pointed out that local governments are not permitted to run deficits legally.  Although the 
local governments can bypass this restriction to finance deficits by borrowing money from the 
market, the central government’s fiscal deficit still affects its relative bargaining power. 
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Trade openness: Trading activity by China’s coastal provinces has contributed to its recent rapid 
economic growth.  Therefore, trade promotion may affect the relative bargaining power of the 
central government and the local government group.  There are several ways of measuring trade 
openness, or trade liberalization (see, for example, Harrison, 1996, and Yanikkaya, 2003).  
Because of data availability, we use the trade share as a measure of trade openness. 
Degree of urbanization: Because Wagner’s Law (see Bird, 1971) suggests that urbanization 
increases the needs for public spending, the degree of urbanization may affect the relative 
bargaining power of the central government and the local government group. 
Regional income inequality: Under fiscal federalism, an important role of the central 
government is to ease regional economic inequality.  If China’s central government is to achieve 
its goal of a “Harmonious Society”, then not only income redistribution but also fiscal 
redistribution is important.  To measure regional income inequality, we use Atkinson’s (1970) 
inequality index.  To measure income inequality between China’s provinces, given population 
weights for each region ( M,...,2,1i,wi  ), the Atkinson measure is 
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where iw  and ix  are the population weights and the average income of the ith province, 
respectively,   is national average income, and N is the total population.  The parameter  
represents the degree of inequality aversion.  Atkinson’s original measure of  is based on the 
social welfare function and represents the degree of inequality aversion, which reflects relative 
sensitivity to income transfers at different income levels.  When  is high, the weight assigned to 
an individual with a relatively low (high) level of income is large (small).  When ,0  which is 
an extreme case, individuals are indifferent to income redistribution.  Treating the social welfare 
function in this way is an advantage of the Atkinson measure.  We obtained the required data from 
the China Compendium of Statistics 1949–2008, compiled by the Department of Comprehensive 
Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics (2010).  For estimation, we calculated A based on 
three different values ( 9.0and,5.0,1.0 ).  We also used    to allow for a potentially 
nonlinear effect of the Atkinson measure. 
Table 1 defines the independent variables and reports their data sources, and Table 2 
reports their summary statistics and those of the dependent variable. 
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4.3 Estimation Results 
To estimate the system of equations given by (6), we used SUR and selected the 
independent variables based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  To check the robustness 
of the estimation results, we estimated the chosen model by using the IV method and GMM.  To 
apply the IV method in three stages, we first constructed the instruments, then estimated each 
equation, and then estimated the system of equations.  (The method is often referred to as “three 
stage least squares”.)  For both IV and GMM estimation, we used lagged independent variables as 
instruments.  We used one lag of the independent variables for IV and used two lags for GMM; 
this is because we needed one MA lag for the error terms.  We used two types of fiscal shares for 
the dependent variables: budgetary revenue and expenditure shares based on excluding and 
including extra budgetary revenues and expenditures.  Figure 1 illustrates both.  They exhibit 
similar trends, but there are apparent differences over time.  As mentioned earlier, Tsui (2005) 
and Tochkov (2007) pointed out the reverse effects of central government budgetary transfers and 
extra budgetary funds on local governments’ expenditures 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the budgetary shares, and Table 4 reports the 
results of the robustness checks.  The sample period covered is from 1982 to 2008, primarily 
because of data availability on Atkinson’s measure and on extra budgetary revenues and 
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expenditures.  Table 5 reports estimation results based on including extra budgetary revenues and 
expenditures in the shares, and Table 6 reports the results of the robustness checks.  In all cases, 
the model that includes the Atkinson measure “Atkins09” generates the lowest AIC, so we report 
only these results.  Before discussing the sources of relative bargaining power, we make two 
points.  The first relates to the goodness of fit of the estimated equations.  Whether extra 
budgetary items are included or excluded, the estimated revenue functions do not fit the data well.  
This may be because the shares changed dramatically between 1993 and 1994.  Unobservable 
political factors may have affected these shares.  When extra budgetary items are included, the fit 
of the revenue function deteriorates.  This suggests that political factors might have played a role 
in determining extra budgetary revenue.  The second point concerns the robustness of the 
estimation results.  According to the robustness checks reported in Tables 4 and 6, with some 
exceptions, the estimated coefficients have the same signs, are of similar magnitudes, and are 
equally statistically significant.  Exceptions are the coefficients of “Def” in the budgetary 
expenditure function and the revenue function based on including extra budgetary items.  In the 
budgetary share function, the robustness checks generate larger coefficients of “Growth”, “Infl”, 
and “Atkins09” than before.  In the expenditure function based on including extra budgetary 
items, following the robustness checks, the coefficient of “Pgdp” increases, and that of “Growth” 
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decreases.  These changes might signal some correlation between the independent variables and 
the error term. 
Comparing the estimated coefficients based on including and excluding extra budgetary 
items reveals three main findings.  First, in the expenditure functions, the coefficients of 
“Atkins09” are negative when excluding extra items but positive when including them.  (The 
variable is not selected for the revenue functions.)  This suggests that an increase in income 
inequality does not affect revenue shares but does reduce local governments’ budgetary 
expenditure shares.  This may be because greater income inequality lowers local governments’ 
bargaining power within the budgetary system.  However, this reduced bargaining power is offset 
by gaining more bargaining power over extra budgetary expenditures.  This is consistent with 
Tochkov’s (2007) finding relating to the smoothing of provincial expenditures.  Second, the 
coefficients of “Pgdp” are negative in the budgetary expenditure functions when excluding extra 
budgetary items but are positive when including them.  Our interpretation of this is based on 
consideration of the coefficient of “Growth” in the expenditure function based on including extra 
items.  As with “Atkins09,” although an increase in real per capita GDP lowers local governments’ 
relative bargaining power within the budgetary system, this decrease is offset by the extra 
bargaining power over extra budgetary expenditures.  However, the latter additional bargaining 
power is abated when macroeconomic performance is good (when economic growth is high).  The 
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third finding relates to the coefficients of “UrbanR”.  This variable has a positive coefficient in 
both the budgetary revenue function (without extra items) and the budgetary expenditure function 
(including extra items), but otherwise, the variable is not selected by the AIC.  This suggests that 
although urbanization increases budgetary revenues for provincial governments, it also narrows 
the scope for extra budgetary expenditures; hence, urbanization lowers local governments’ 
relative bargaining power over extra budgetary expenditure. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a new empirical approach to analyzing fiscal decentralization 
and applied it to Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations.  In calculating the budgetary shares 
of the central and provincial governments, we included extra budgetary revenues and 
expenditures.  We obtained a number of important findings.  First, an increase in income 
inequality reduces the relative bargaining power of local governments within the budgetary 
system.  However, this reduction is offset by additional bargaining power over extra budgetary 
expenditures.  Second, an increase in real per capita GDP reduces local governments’ relative 
bargaining power within the budgetary system.  This reduction is offset by additional bargaining 
power over extra budgetary expenditures but to a lesser extent when macroeconomic performance 
is good.  Third, although urbanization increases budgetary revenues for provincial governments, 
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it also narrows the scope for extra budgetary expenditures, and hence, urbanization lowers the 
relative bargaining power of local governments in determining extra budgetary expenditures. 
Our analysis has limitations.  First, we used a simple model to analyze bargaining 
between the central government and a group of local governments.  A model that explains the 
bargaining process between the central government and local governments simultaneously would 
be more complex but more applicable to actual data.  We plan to do this in the future.  A second 
problem relates to the short period covered by our study (1982–2008), which was limited by data 
availability on extra budgetary shares and the Atkinson measure of inequality.  If more past data 
on extra budgetary shares become available, and as more data are accumulated in the future, we 
can reestimate our models and obtain more robust results.  This remains a task for future research. 
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Table 1. Data Sources 
Data for Independent Variables Definition Source 
Population (Pop) National population China Statistical Yearbook 
Real per capita GDP (Pgdp)          (               )
    (        )            
 
China Statistical Yearbook 
Economic growth rate (Growth) Annual rate of change in real GDP China Statistical Yearbook 
Inflation rate (Infl) Annual rate of change in CPI (1950 = 100) China Statistical Yearbook 
Central government’s fiscal deficit (Def)                                          
                      
 
China Statistical Yearbook 
Economic openness (Open)                                 
           
 
China Statistical Yearbook 
Degree of urbanization (UrbanR) Proportion of urban population China Statistical Yearbook 
Regional income inequality (Atkins0x) Given in main text China Compendium of Statistics 
1949–2008 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
  (
  
    
) 0.2457 0.4471 –0.2290 1.2646 
  (
  
    
): including extra budgetary revenues 0.3908 0.2629 0.0471 1.3361 
  (
  
    
) 0.7658 0.3338 –0.1559 1.3058 
  (
  
    
): including extra budgetary expenditures 0.8505 0.3599 0.1341 1.3900 
ln(Pop) 11.6942 0.0793 11.5425 11.7966 
Pgdp 1.1272 0.7455 0.3423 2.9896 
Growth 0.1024 0.0440 –0.0427 0.1768 
Infl 0.0621 0.0685 –0.0140 0.2408 
Def 0.0670 0.0444 –0.0309 0.1568 
Open 0.3787 0.1486 0.1442 0.6652 
UrbanR 0.3230 0.0758 0.2162 0.4568 
Atkins01 0.0107 0.0012 0.0083 0.0127 
Atkins05 0.0506 0.0062 0.0387 0.0607 
Atkins09 0.0857 0.0114 0.0651 0.1038 
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Table 3.  Estimation Results for the Budgetary Shares 
 Full Model Model Selected by AIC 
Variables Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Constant –70.9584* –75.1135** –80.7280** –85.6846** 
 (–2.017) (–4.819) (–2.861) (–12.229) 
ln(Pop) 5.27796 6.33183** 6.86135** 7.50318** 
 (1.701) (4.508) (2.825) (12.327) 
Pgdp –9.32810* –2.02503 –6.28150** –.284383** 
 (–2.269) (–1.544) (–4.041) (–4.608) 
Pgdp
2
 .340996 .340996 1.13467**  
 (1.281) (1.281) (3.934)  
Growth 2.79449 –.628439 3.00981**  
 (1.746) (–1.215) (2.596)  
Infl .949975 .621916  .968167** 
 (.812) (1.295)  (4.162) 
Def –4.39256 –3.76381** –3.82925 –3.07697** 
 (–1.746) (–4.610) (–1.899) (–4.751) 
Open .911166 .203543   
 (.570) (.453)   
UrbanR 32.7653* 5.40209 17.6969**  
 (2.413) (1.423) (2.714)  
Atkins09 138.005 42.6128  –76.6489** 
 (.940) (1.449)  (–3.973) 
Atkins09
2
 –768.463 –14392.6   
 (–.925) (1.281)   
R
2
 .7619 .9555 .7323 .9481 
S.E. .2139 .0689 .2268 .0745 
LM-hetero .0453 .996 .258 2.716 
Durbin–Watson 2.233 2.019 1.915 1.755 
AIC –30.105 –42.572 
Log likelihood 37.052 34.176 
Notes: ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Total number of observations is 26. 
Log likelihood value is produced by the LSE calculation in TSP 5.0. 
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Table 4.  Robustness Checks for the Budgetary Shares 
 IV Method GMM 
Instruments Lagged independent variables with 
one lag in Full Model in Table 3 
Lagged independent variables with two 
lags in Full Model in Table 3 
No. of MA lags 
NMA) 
– NMA = 1 
Variables Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Constant –114.604** –78.7209** –63.3838* –80.2603* 
 (–2.867) (–7.150) (–2.511) (–2.511) 
ln(Pop) 9.63791** 6.89898** 5.34143* 7.04700** 
 (2.816) (7.256) (2.428) (7.987) 
Pgdp –7.59352** –.203628 –5.57883** –.204070* 
 (–3.528) (–1.959) (–4.744) (–2.335) 
Pgdp
2
 1.15342**  .969575**  
 (2.899)  (4.737)  
Growth 4.74727*  6.48473**  
 (2.396)  (2.619)  
Infl  1.54848**  1.54857** 
  (4.253)  (4.710) 
Def –11.2193* –2.17757 –4.49608** –1.59382 
 (–2.370) (1.680) (–2.882) (–1.386) 
UrbanR 27.5069**  16.4978**  
 (2.796)  (2.732)  
Atkins09  –84.5667**  –105.915** 
  (–3.188)  (–5.240) 
R
2
 .6239 .9391 .6054 .9321 
S.E. .2886 .0810 .2897 .0864 
Durbin–Watson 2.042 1.598 1.785 1.512 
Test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
– 4.910 
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Estimation Results for Shares based on Inclusion of Extra Budgetary Items 
 Full Model Model Selected by AIC 
Variables Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Revenue Function Expenditure 
Function 
Constant –62.1524* –76.2038**  –67.5556** 
 (–2.311) (–5.259)  (–10.697) 
ln(Pop) 5.07422* 6.61348** .056502** 5.90843** 
 (2.145) (5.073) (9.436) (10.620) 
Pgdp –3.89849 –.070671 –.239437** .342816** 
 (–1.244) (–.057) (–4.594) (3.082) 
Pgdp
2
 .687235 .069068   
 (1.120) (.277)   
Growth 1.31638 –1.32909**  –1.80108** 
 (1.078) (–2.744)  (–5.457) 
Infl .741687 .352423   
 (.829) (.788)   
Def –3.37549 –3.05842**  –2.39801** 
 (–1.754) (–3.989)  (–4.145) 
Open –.775042 –4.13882   
 (–.637) (–1.165)   
UrbanR 11.3221 –4.13882  –6.31107** 
 (1.098) (–1.165)  (–5.135) 
Atkins09 58.5486 19.4555  15.2672** 
 (.532) (.718)  (3.082) 
Atkins09
2
 –264.791 –1285.89   
 (–.426) (–.164)   
R
2
 .5971 .9663 .4419 .9615 
S.E. .1636 .0647 .1925 .0692 
LM-hetero 4.372* .188 .226 .056 
Durbin–Watson 2.499 2.469 2.108 2.269 
AIC –49.440 –66.023 
Log likelihood 46.720 42.011 
Notes: ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
Total number of observations is 26. 
Log likelihood value is produced by the LSE calculation in TSP 5.0. 
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Table 6.  Robustness Checks for Shares based on Inclusion of Extra Budgetary Items 
 IV Method GMM 
Instruments Lagged independent variables with 
one lag in Full Model in Table 3 
Lagged independent variables with 
two lags in Full Model in Table 3 
No. of MA lags 
(NMA) 
– NMA = 1 
Variables Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Revenue 
Function 
Expenditure 
Function 
Constant  –61.8018**  –67.6795** 
  (–7.965)  (–10.248) 
ln(Pop) .056445** 5.43945** .056237** 5.95254** 
 (9.424) (8.069) (27.890) (10.247) 
Pgdp –.238845** .548079** –.232930** .521002** 
 (–4.581) (2.918) (–12.424) (5.899) 
Growth  –2.26641**  –2.04969** 
  (–4.679)  (–3.648) 
Def  –1.10426  –1.39878* 
  (–.880)  (–2.315) 
UrbanR  –7.80057**  –7.97662** 
  (–4.444)  (–7.678) 
Atkins09  14.5818**  14.1752** 
  (4.163)  (7.870) 
R2 .4419 .9486 .4419 .9552 
S.E. .1925 .0800 .1926 .0747 
Durbin–Watson 2.108 2.162 2.105 2.237 
Test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
– 10.004 
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Figure 1.  Trends in Budgetary Shares based on Inclusion of Extra Budgetary Items 
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